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Abstract
As the complexity of real-world systems continues to increase, so does the need for dis-
tributed protocols that are capable of guaranteeing a satisfactory system performance, without
the reliance on centralized decision making. In this respect, game theory provides a valuable
framework for the design of distributed algorithms in the form of equilibrium efficiency bounds.
Arguably one of the most widespread performance metrics, the price-of-anarchy measures how
the efficiency of a system degrades when moving from centralized to distributed decision making.
While the smoothness framework – introduced in [1] – has emerged as a powerful methodology
for bounding the price-of-anarchy, the resulting bounds are often conservative, bringing into
question the suitability of the smoothness approach for the design of distributed protocols. In
this paper, we introduce the notion of generalized smoothness in order to overcome these diffi-
culties. First, we show that generalized smoothness arguments are more widely applicable, and
provide tighter price-of-anarchy bounds compared to those obtained using the existing smooth-
ness framework. Second, we show how to leverage the notion of generalized smoothness to
obtain a tight characterization of the price-of-anarchy, relative to the class of local cost-sharing
games. Within this same class of games we show that the price-of-anarchy can be computed
and optimized through the solution of a tractable linear program. Finally, we demonstrate that
our approach subsumes and generalizes existing results for three well-studied classes of games.
1 Introduction
With the advent of large-scale multiagent systems, in, e.g., transportation networks [2, 3] and
power grids [4], no central coordinator will be able to dictate the actions of individual agents while
adhering to the stringent constraints imposed by their size, security requirements, and limited
communication. A promising alternative is the use of decentralized protocols, in which the local
decision-making components harmoniously achieve some predefined global objective, while satisfy-
ing the requirements for scalability, privacy and communication overhead. Distributed algorithms
have been successfully designed and deployed in many different engineering applications, including
– but, not limited to – distributed computation [5], multirobot control [6], cryptography [7], and
congestion management in large-scale networks [8].
A popular and effective method for deriving efficient distributed protocols consists of designing a
centralized algorithm, that is later distributed by leveraging the structure of the problem considered,
∗A manuscript containing preliminary results will appear in the proceedings of the 2019 IEEE Conference on De-
cision and Control, under the title “When Smoothness is not Enough: Toward Exact Quantification and Optimization
of the Price-of-Anarchy”. This work is supported by ONR grant #N00014-17-1-2060, NSF grant #ECCS-1638214,
and SNSF grant #P2EZP2 181618.
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see e.g., [9, 10]. Complementary to this design philosophy, our work focuses on the so-called game
design approach [11, 12] wherein the local decision-making processes are not designed explicitly.
Instead, the design of distributed protocols emerges as the result of two steps: utility design, and
learning design [13]. First, the interactions of the system’s agents are modelled as a strategic
form game in which the local decision-making components are the players, and each player is
associated with a permissible set of actions as well as with a utility function. Second, each agent
is assigned a local learning rule that specifies its dynamical behaviour in response to the available
local information. The outcome of the game-theoretic approach is a distributed algorithm that
is asynchronous, robust, and scalable, with performance certificates in the form of bounds on the
efficiency of emergent equilibria. One practical equilibrium efficiency bound is the so-called price-
of-anarchy [14], which represents the worst-case ratio between the cost of an equilibrium and the
optimal cost. While other metrics are equally important (e.g., transient performance), improving
our ability to characterize and optimize the price-of-anarchy remains central to the advancement
of the game design approach. The focus of this work lays on the first step of the game-theoretic
approach: utility design, where we utilize the price-of-anarchy as the resulting performance metric.
In this respect, the primary objective of this paper is to answer the two following questions:
• How can we quantify the price-of-anarchy of a given class of games?
• How can we design the agents’ cost/utility functions so as to optimize the price-of-anarchy?
Many works use utility design to derive incentive mechanisms, and to improve efficiency guaran-
tees in multiagent systems, in a variety of contexts, including congestion in traffic networks [15, 16],
minimum set cover [17, 18], server load-balancing [19], assignment of credit in teams [20], and list
decoding [21]. While the study of learning design is a vast and vital area of research, see e.g.,
[22, 23], it falls outside the scope of this paper.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our main contributions can be summarized in four parts.
1. We define a new notion of smoothness, which we call generalized smoothness (Definition 1),
and show how it automatically yields upper-bounds on the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 1). We
demonstrate that the efficiency bounds obtained using generalized smoothness arguments are
tighter, in general, than those derived using traditional smoothness techniques. Addition-
ally, we show that generalized smoothness arguments are applicable to classes of games for
which traditional smoothness techniques are inadmissible. Finally, we prove that generalized
smoothness arguments tightly characterize the efficiency of average coarse-correlated equilibria
in all classes of games (Theorem 2).
2. We show that generalized smoothness arguments tightly characterize the price-of-anarchy for
local cost-sharing games (Theorem 3). As a consequence, we are able to construct tractable
linear programs to compute the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 4), as well as to derive utilities that
optimize the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 5) within such games. We have prepared MATLAB®
and Python code that solves these linear programs.1
3. We show that all of the results in this work extend to the setting of welfare-maximization games,
and present their analogues in Theorems 6 to 9.
4. For three well-studied classes of games, we demonstrate that generalized smoothness arguments
can be used to subsume and generalize well-known results.
1See https://github.com/rahul-chandan/resalloc-poa for these software packages, and sample scripts. A
MATLAB® graphical user-interface is available at https://github.com/rahul-chandan/resalloc-gui.
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1.2 Related Works
The characterization and optimization of the price-of-anarchy as a performance metric in distributed
resource-allocation has recently received significant interest [24, 25, 26, e.g.]. One of the difficul-
ties in analyzing the price-of-anarchy, as originally defined in [14], stems from the multiplicity of
equilibria as a result of unsplittable (atomic) player demand. Many past works have focused on
the continuous-flow (nonatomic) approximation of this problem, where uniqueness of equilibrium
is often guaranteed. In nonatomic setups, numerous tight price-of-anarchy bounds and optimal
mechanisms have been derived [27, 28, 29, e.g.]. This work analyzes the price-of-anarchy of atomic
resource-allocation problems, and explicitly addresses the multiplicity of equilibria.
A well-established method for obtaining price-of-anarchy bounds in the atomic setting leverages
the so-called smoothness framework. This approach [30, 31] has not only proven useful when char-
acterizing the performance of broad classes of equilibria [32, 33, e.g.], it has also been applied to a
variety of problems, including learning [34], and mechanism design [35]. Unfortunately, as observed
in [36, Thm. 1], the traditional smoothness argument finds limited applicability in connection to
the utility design problems considered in this work. Generalized smoothness is tailored to resolve
this weakness, while retaining all the strengths of traditional smoothness.
The notion of generalized smoothness presented in this work is most similar to the style of
argument used in [17, 18] to quantify the price-of-anarchy of covering problems. More specifically,
this work builds upon the results in [36, 37], where the authors develop a linear programming
framework for characterizing and optimizing the efficiency of pure Nash equilibria in a well-studied
class of resource-allocation games. The notion of generalized smoothness, introduced here for
the first time, permits a non-trivial extension of their framework: we are now able to construct
linear programs for computing and optimizing the (average) coarse-correlated equilibrium efficiency,
relative to a broader class of problems, including the well-studied classes of congestion games [38,
39], and probabilistic-objective games [40, 20].
While linear programming approaches for computing the price-of-anarchy appeared in [41, 42],
[41] considers weighted congestion games, a distinct class of problems from those considered in this
work. Additionally, the techniques introduced in both these works can not be used to compute
the price-of-anarchy of a class of games in a tractable fashion. In stark contrast, the linear pro-
grams derived in this work are tractable. Our gains in tractability come from a non-trivial game
parametrization by which a given game instance can be described with O(n3) numbers, where n is
the number of players in the game.
2 Cost-Minimization Games
2.1 Model
We consider a class of cost-minimization problems where we are given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n},
and each agent i ∈ N must select an action ai from a finite set Ai. The system cost induced by an
allocation a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A = A1 × · · · × An is measured by the function C : A → R>0. The
objective is to find an optimal allocation, i.e.,
aopt ∈ argmin
a∈A
C(a). (1)
The focus of this work is on deriving near-optimal distributed solutions to the optimization in (1).
In particular, we consider the framework of cost-minimization games as the game-theoretic model
for the class of cost-minimization problems defined above. A cost-minimization game G is defined
by a player set N , in which each player i ∈ N evaluates its choice ai ∈ Ai using a local cost function
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Ji : A → R. We represent a cost-minimization game as defined above as a tuple G = (N,A, C,J ),
where J = {J1, . . . , Jn}.
2.2 Equilibrium model and performance metrics
In the forthcoming analysis, we will focus on the solution concept of pure Nash equilibrium2, which
is defined in cost-minimization games as any allocation ane ∈ A such that,
Ji(a
ne) ≤ Ji(ai, ane−i) ∀ai ∈ Ai,∀i ∈ N, (2)
where a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an). For a given instance G, let NE(G) denote the set of all
allocations a ∈ A that satisfy (2). Under the assumption that the set NE(G) is non-empty, we
define the price-of-anarchy of the game G as
PoA(G) :=
maxa∈NE(G) C(a)
mina∈A C(a)
≥ 1. (3)
The price-of-anarchy represents the ratio between the costs of the worst-performing pure Nash
equilibrium in the game G, and the optimal allocation. For a given class of cost-minimization
games G, which may contain infinitely many game instances, we further define the price-of-anarchy
as,
PoA(G) := sup
G∈G
PoA(G) ≥ 1. (4)
Note that a lower price-of-anarchy corresponds to an improved performance, and PoA(G) = 1
means that all pure Nash equilibria of the game G are optimal.
2.3 Smoothness in Cost-Minimization Games
In this section, we review the notion of smooth games, and recall how this can be used to bound the
corresponding price-of-anarchy. The cost-minimization game G is (λ, µ)-smooth [31] if
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥
C(a) for all a ∈ A, and if, for any two allocations a, a′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ < 1 satisfying∑
i∈N
Ji(a
′
i, a−i) ≤ λC(a′) + µC(a). (5)
The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-smooth game G is upper-bounded as
PoA(G) ≤ λ
1− µ.
Observe that if all the games in a class G are shown to be (λ, µ)-smooth, then the price-of-anarchy of
the class PoA(G) is also upper-bounded by λ/(1−µ). We refer to the best upper-bound obtainable
using a smoothness argument on a given class of games G as the robust price-of-anarchy, i.e.,
RPoA(G) := inf
λ>0,µ<1
{
λ
1− µ s.t. (5) holds ∀G ∈ G
}
. (6)
Note that, the robust price-of-anarchy represents only an upper-bound on the price-of-anarchy, i.e.
for any class of (λ, µ)-smooth games G, PoA(G) ≤ RPoA(G), and it could be PoA(G) < RPoA(G).
A special and widely-studied class of cost-minimization games is that of congestion games, which
we recall next.
2 Although we present our results in relation to pure Nash equilibria, we demonstrate in the next section that
all the performance bounds we obtain extend automatically to the set of all average coarse-correlated equilibria. We
note that the set of average coarse-correlated equilibria of a game contains all of the game’s pure Nash, mixed Nash,
correlated, and coarse-correlated equilibria. This is significant, as average coarse-correlated equilibria are guaranteed
to exist in a broader class of games than pure Nash equilibria [43], and learning rules exist that have polynomial-time
convergence to such equilibria [44].
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Example 1 (Congestion games [38, 39]). A congestion game is defined as a game G with player
set N = {1, . . . , n} and set of resources R, where every player i ∈ N selects an action ai from its
corresponding set of permissible actions Ai ⊆ 2R. Each resource r ∈ R has an associated latency
function ℓr : N → R. For a given allocation a = (a1, . . . , an), the system cost, and player cost
functions are defined as
C(a) =
∑
r∈R
ℓr(|a|r)|a|r, Ji(a) =
∑
r∈ai
ℓr(|a|r).
Congestion games are a popular class of games that have found applications in settings ranging
from traffic management [45], to server load-balancing [19].
3 Generalized Smoothness in Cost-Minimization Games
3.1 Generalized smoothness framework
In the following we introduce the notion of generalized smoothness. We show how generalized
smoothness provides provably tighter price-of-anarchy bounds than traditional smoothness, and is
applicable to a larger class of problems.
Definition 1 (Generalized smoothness). The cost-minimization gameG is (λ, µ)-generalized smooth
if, for any two allocations a, a′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ < 1 satisfying,
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
′
i, a−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a) + C(a) ≤ λC(a′) + µC(a). (7)
Note that we maintain the notation of (λ, µ) as in traditional smoothness for ease of comparison.
In the specific case when
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A, the condition (7) is equivalent to the
traditional smoothness condition in (5). It is straightforward to observe that a (λ, µ)-generalized
smooth game inherits a price-of-anarchy upper-bound of λ/(1− µ), as formalized next.
Theorem 1. The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-generalized smooth game G is upper-bounded as,
PoA(G) ≤ λ
1− µ.
Proof. For all ane ∈ NE(G) and aopt ∈ A,
C(ane) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) + C(ane) ≤ λC(aopt) + µC(ane). (8)
The first inequality holds by (2), and the second, by (7). Rearranging (8), we get the result.
We define the generalized robust price-of-anarchy of a class of cost-minimization games G as the
best upper-bound obtainable using a generalized smoothness argument, i.e.,
GPoA(G) := inf
λ>0,µ<1
{
λ
1− µ s.t. (7) holds ∀G ∈ G
}
. (9)
The proposition below highlights how generalized smoothness remediates several weaknesses of
the traditional smoothness framework. In the following, we consider the case of
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a)
for all a ∈ A solely to ensure that RPoA(G) is well-defined. Meanwhile, GPoA(G) and PoA(G) are
well-defined irrespective of whether
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a), or
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) < C(a).
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Proposition 1. Consider any cost-minimization game G such that
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a) for all
a ∈ A. The following statements compare the price-of-anarchy PoA(G), the robust price-of-anarchy
RPoA(G), and the generalized robust price-of-anarchy GPoA(G):
i. The generalized robust price-of-anarchy is always a better upper-bound on the price-of-anarchy
than the robust price-of-anarchy, i.e., for any (λ, µ)-smooth game G,
RPoA(G) ≥ GPoA(G) ≥ PoA(G).
Furthermore, if
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) > C(a) for all a ∈ A, then RPoA(G) > GPoA(G).
ii. The price-of-anarchy, and generalized robust price-of-anarchy are shift-, and scale-invariant,
i.e., for any given γ > 0 and (δ1, . . . , δn) ∈ Rn,
PoA((N,A, C, {Ji}ni=1)) = PoA((N,A, C, {γJi + δi}ni=1)),
GPoA((N,A, C, {Ji}ni=1)) = GPoA((N,A, C, {γJi + δi}ni=1)).
None of these properties hold for the robust price-of-anarchy.
iii. The robust price-of-anarchy is optimized by budget-balanced local cost functions, i.e., any set
of local cost functions J ∗ = {J∗1 , . . . , J∗n} such that
∑n
i=1 J
∗
i (a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A satisfies
J ∗ ∈ argmin
J
RPoA((N,A, C,J )).
In general, this does not hold for PoA((N,A, C,J )), and GPoA((N,A, C,J )).
Proof. For a given game G = (N,A, C, {Ji}), we define G′ = (N,A, C, {γJi + δi}) for given γ > 0
and {δi}ni=1 ∈ Rn. Note that PoA(G) = PoA(G′), since the definition of optimal allocation (1), and
the equilibrium conditions (2) are shift-, and scale-invariant.
Part ii. We begin by showing that GPoA(G) is shift-, and scale-invariant. For the game G,
we define λ∗ > 0 and µ∗ < 1 as the optimal generalized smoothness parameters from (9), i.e.
GPoA(G) = λ∗/(1 − µ∗), and
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
′
i, a−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a) + C(a) ≤ λ∗C(a′) + µ∗C(a).
Observe that the values {δi}ni=1 ∈ Rn cancel in the generalized smoothness condition, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
[γJi(a
′
i, a−i) + δi]−
n∑
i=1
[γJi(a) + δi] + C(a) =
n∑
i=1
γJi(a
′
i, a−i)−
n∑
i=1
γJi(a) + C(a).
We are interested in parameters λ > 0 and µ < 1 that optimize the ratio λ/(1−µ), and that satisfy,
γ
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
′
i, a−i)− γ
n∑
i=1
Ji(a) + C(a) ≤ λC(a′) + µC(a), ∀a, a′ ∈ A.
By (9), the optimal choice of (λ, µ) is λ = λ∗γ > 0, and µ = (µ∗ − 1)γ + 1 < 1. Thus, for any
γ > 0, we obtain GPoA(G′) = λ∗/(1 − µ∗) = GPoA(G).
Next, we show that RPoA(G) is neither shift-, nor scale-invariant. Let λ∗ > 0 and µ∗ < 1 be
the optimal smoothness parameters from (6), i.e. RPoA(G) = λ∗/(1− µ∗). First, we consider how
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the robust price-of-anarchy responds to a shift, i.e., we fix γ = 1. We are interested in λ > 0 and
µ < 1 such that,
n∑
i=1
[
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i) + δi
]
≤ λC(aopt) + µC(ane).
Since the above condition grows stricter as the value of the left-hand side expression is increased,
it holds that RPoA(G) < RPoA(G′) for δi > 0, for all i ∈ N . Similarly, RPoA(G) > RPoA(G′) for
δi < 0, so long as G
′ remains (λ, µ)-smooth. Next, for G′ such that γ > 0 and δi = 0,
C(ane) ≤ γ
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) ≤ γ
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt, ane−i) ≤ γλ∗ C(aopt) + γµ∗ C(ane),
where the above inequalities hold by (λ, µ)-smoothness, by (2), and by (5), respectively. Observe
that, for 0 < γ < 1,
RPoA(G′) ≤ λ
∗
γ−1 − µ∗ <
λ∗
1− µ∗ = RPoA(G).
Similarly, RPoA(G′) > RPoA(G) for γ > 1, as long as G′ remains (λ, µ)-smooth.
Part i. Since the condition
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A implies that any pair of (λ, µ)
satisfying (5) necessarily satisfies (7), we note that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is at
least as strict an upper-bound as the robust price-of-anarchy, in general. Note that for any game
G with
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) > C(a) for all a ∈ A there must exist 0 < γ < 1 such that
∑n
i=1 γJi(a) ≥ C(a),
and that PoA(G′) = PoA(G). Because the robust price-of-anarchy is not scale-invariant, it follows
that PoA(G) = PoA(G′) ≤ RPoA(G′) < RPoA(G). We previously showed that the generalized
robust price-of-anarchy GPoA(G′) is less than or equal to the robust price-of-anarchy RPoA(G′),
and that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is scale-invariant (i.e., GPoA(G) = GPoA(G′)).
Thus,
PoA(G) ≤ GPoA(G) = GPoA(G′) ≤ RPoA(G′) < RPoA(G).
Part iii. Given two sets of local cost functions J = {J1, . . . , Jn} and J ′ = {J ′1, . . . , J ′n}, observe
that the robust price-of-anarchy of the game G = (N,A, C,J ) is lower than, or equal to that
of G′ = (N,A, C,J ′) if ∑ni=1 Ji(a) ≤ ∑ni=1 J ′i(a) for all a ∈ A. This is because the smoothness
condition (5) for G is less restrictive on values λ > 0, µ < 1, than for G′. Extending this reasoning,
the smoothness condition (5) is least strict for choice of
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A, since
any further decrease in
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) will violate the condition
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A. The
above reasoning does not hold for the price-of-anarchy and generalized robust price-of-anarchy of
a game G. In particular, the utility function that optimizes the price-of-anarchy and generalized
robust price-of-anarchy in the class of covering games [17] is not budget-balanced [18, 46].
3.2 Average coarse-correlated equilibria
Although conceptually simple, pure Nash equilibria can be intractable to find, or even nonexistent,
in general. Fortunately, all performance bounds obtained in this work extend automatically to the
more general class of average coarse-correlated equilibria, defined below.
Definition 2. For a given cost-minimization game G, we define an average coarse-correlated equi-
librium as a probability distribution over the set of actions σ ∈ ∆(A) satisfying, for all a′ ∈ A,
Ea∼σ
[
N∑
i=1
Ji(a)
]
:=
∑
a∈A
[
σa
N∑
i=1
Ji(a)
]
≤
∑
a∈A
[
σa
N∑
i=1
Ji(ai, a
′
−i)
]
, (10)
where σa ∈ [0, 1] is the probability associated with action a ∈ A in the distribution σ.
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Observe that this definition of average coarse-correlated equilibrium is a generalization of its first
definition in [42], as the two definitions are equivalent for any game G with
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) = C(a) for all
a ∈ A. Our notion of average coarse-correlated equilibrium is more natural, as it is independent of
the system cost function like many other notions of equilibrium, e.g., pure Nash equilibrium, coarse-
correlated equilibrium. Note that the set of average coarse-correlated equilibria of a game contains
all of the game’s pure Nash equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria and coarse-
correlated equilibria [31, 42]. Here we show that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy tightly
characterizes the average coarse-correlated equilibrium performance of any cost-minimization game
G, and, thus, of any class of cost-minimization games G.
Theorem 2. For any (λ, µ)-generalized smooth game G,
maxσ∈ACCE(G) Ea∼σ[C(a)]
mina∈A C(a)
≤ λ
1− µ,
where the set ACCE(G) contains all the average coarse-correlated equilibria of the game G.
Furthermore,
maxσ∈ACCE(G) Ea∼σ[C(a)]
mina∈A C(a)
= GPoA(G).
Proof. We observe that the first claim of this theorem follows directly from the second, and thus it
is sufficient to prove only the second. This proof is adapted from [42, Thm. 2.7] for our generalized
definition of average coarse-correlated equilibrium in (10). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the optimal allocation aopt ∈ A is known a priori. Any pair of parameters λ > 0, µ < 1 that
solve (9) for G = {G} is also the solution to the following program:
min
λ>0,µ<1
λ
1− µ s.t.
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a) + C(a) ≤ λC(aopt) + µC(a) ∀a ∈ A.
Setting u = λ/(1 − µ) and v = 1/(1− µ), this further simplifies to the following linear program
min
u>0,v>0
u s.t. C(a) ≥ uC(aopt)− v
n∑
i=1
[
Ji(a
opt
i , a−i)− Ji(a)
]
∀a ∈ A.
Taking the dual of the above linear program, and rescaling such that C(aopt) = 1, we obtain
the following equivalent linear program
max
σ∈∆(A)
∑
a∈A
σa
C(a)
C(aopt)
s.t.
∑
a∈A
σa
n∑
i=1
[
Ji(a
opt
i , a−i)− Ji(a)
]
≥ 0,
∑
a∈A
σa = 1, σa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,
where the rescaling is valid because C(aopt) > 0 for the definition of price-of-anarchy. Observe
that this last linear program is identical to the primal linear program for computing the worst-case
average coarse-correlated equilibrium efficiency as in [42, Thm. 2.7] for the modified condition for
average coarse-correlated equilibrium in (10).
4 Efficiency Guarantees in Local Cost-Sharing Games
4.1 Model
We consider a class of cost-minimization games, termed local cost-sharing games, that are widely
studied in the existing literature [32, 19, 41, 25, e.g.]. A local-cost sharing game G consists of a set
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of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and a finite set of resources R, where each resource r ∈ R has a cost
function cr : N → R and a cost-generating function fr : N → R. Each player i ∈ N is associated
with a given action set Ai ⊆ 2R, from which it selects an action ai ∈ Ai. For a given allocation
a ∈ A, the system cost and player cost functions are defined as
C(a) =
∑
r∈R
cr(|a|r), (11)
Ji(ai, a−i) =
∑
r∈ai
fr(|a|r), (12)
where |a|r = |{i ∈ N s.t. r ∈ ai}| represents the number of players selecting the resource r as
part of their action in allocation a. With slight abuse of notation, we extend the definitions of the
resources’ cost functions such that cr(0) = 0 for all r ∈ R, for ease of presentation. We identify
a local cost-sharing game with the tuple G = (N,R,A, {(cr , fr)}), where, to simplify notation, we
have removed the subscripts from the above sets, i.e. we write {(cr, fr)} instead of {(cr, fr)}r∈R.
In many cases, we are interested in computing the price-of-anarchy for classes of local cost-
sharing games. To that end, we define a scalable class of local cost-sharing games GnB , relative to
a finite basis set B = {(c1, f1), . . . , (cm, fm)}, as the set of all n-player local cost-sharing games in
which, for every resource r ∈ R, there exists vr ≥ 0 such that,
cr(·) = vr · c(·), fr(·) = vr · f(·),
for some pair (c, f) ∈ B. Scalable classes of local cost-sharing games are widely studied in the
existing literature. The most well-studied example of such games is congestion games, defined
in Example 1. Indeed, a congestion game can be modelled as a local cost-sharing game where
ce(x) = ℓe(x) · x, and fe(x) = ℓe(x), for all e ∈ E.
Affine congestion games [47, 48]. A special class of atomic congestion games is that of affine
congestion games, in which the edge latency functions are restricted to the form ℓe(x) = aex+ be,
for ae, be ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E. The class of affine congestion games is equivalent to the scalable class of
local cost-sharing games GnB , for choice of basis B = {(c1, f1), (c2, f2)}, where c1(x) = x, f1(x) = 1,
and c2(x) = x
2, f2(x) = x. Affine congestion games were among the first to prompt interest in
equilibrium efficiency, and are shown to have price-of-anarchy equal to 5/2 in [47, 48].
Polynomial congestion games [48, 32]. Similarly, the class of polynomial congestion games of
order d ≥ 1 can be represented by the class GnB , with the basis set B = {(x, 1), . . . , (xd+1, xd)}.
Exact price-of-anarchy bounds for polynomial congestion games are obtained in [32].
4.2 Tightness of generalized robust price-of-anarchy
While the robust price-of-anarchy matches the price-of-anarchy under the restrictive assumption
that C(a) =
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) for all a ∈ A [31], the next theorem shows that the generalized robust
price-of-anarchy is equal to the price-of-anarchy for any scalable class of local cost-sharing games
GnB . This implies that the worst performing average coarse-correlated equilibrium is simply a pure
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, PoA(GnB) is a tight bound not only on the performance of pure Nash
equilibria in GnB, but extends more broadly to the efficiency of all mixed Nash, coarse-correlated,
and average coarse-correlated equilibria.
Theorem 3. For any class of scalable local cost-sharing games GnB, the price-of-anarchy and the
generalized robust price-of-anarchy coincide, i.e., PoA(GnB) = GPoA(GnB). Further, there exists a
game instance G ∈ GnB with resource set R such that |R| ≤ 2n, satisfying PoA(G) = PoA(GnB).
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Proof. We split the proof into the following steps, in part i) we construct an upper-bound on the
generalized robust price-of-anarchy GPoA(GnB), and in parts ii) and iii) we derive game instances
with prices-of-anarchy that match this upper-bound, hence proving PoA(GnB) = GPoA(GnB).
Part i): For any game G, we denote an optimal allocation as aopt, and a worst-performing Nash
equilibrium as ane, i.e. ane ∈ NE(G) such that PoA(G) = C(ane)/C(aopt). For every resource
r ∈ R, let xr = |ane|r, and yr = |aopt|r. We define zr as the number of agents that select resource
r in both ane and aopt, i.e. zr := |{i ∈ N : r ∈ anei } ∩ {i ∈ N : r ∈ aopti }|. We observe that using
the above definitions of (xr, yr, zr) for all r ∈ R, it follows for any game G ∈ GnB that
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i) =
∑
r∈R
(yr − zr)fr(xr + 1) + zrfr(xr).
Informally, if a player i ∈ N selects a given resource r ∈ R in both anei and aopti , then by deviating
from anei to a
opt
i , the player does not add to the load on r, i.e., |aopti , ane−i|r = |ane|r = xr. However,
if r ∈ aopti and r /∈ anei , then |aopti , ane−i|r = |ane|r + 1 = xr + 1. Thus, the left-hand side of the
generalized smoothness condition (7) can be written as
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) + C(ane)
=
∑
r∈R
(yr − zr)fr(xr + 1) + zrfr(xr)−
∑
r∈R
xrfr(xr) +
∑
r∈R
cr(xr)
=
∑
r∈R
[(zr − xr)fr(xr) + (yr − zr)fr(xr + 1) + cr(xr)] .
(13)
Note that for any game G ∈ GnB , zr ≤ min{xr, yr}, and 1 ≤ xr + yr − zr ≤ n. We define
I(n) := {(x, y, z) ∈ N3 s.t. 1 ≤ x+ y − z ≤ n and z ≤ min{x, y}},
and the set S(GnB) as the set of parameters λ > 0, µ < 1 such that,
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1) + c(x) ≤ λc(y) + µc(x), ∀b = (c, f) ∈ B, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ I(n). (14)
Observe that (λ, µ) ∈ S(GnB) that satisfy the above conditions must satisfy the conditions for
generalized smoothness (7), because, by the reasoning in (13), the generalized smoothness condition
can be expressed as a sum of a subset of the conditions in (14). Thus, the following represents an
upper-bound on GPoA(GnB)
γ(GnB) := inf
λ,µ
{λ/(1 − µ) s.t. (λ, µ) ∈ S(GnB)},
i.e. γ(GnB) ≥ GPoA(GnB). We note that γ(GnB) is an infimum and need not be attained. Thus, we
split the rest of the proof between when γ(GnB) is attained for some pair (λˆ, µˆ) ∈ S(GnB) (part ii))
and when it is not (part iii)).
To conclude this part of the proof, we show that it is sufficient to define S(GnB) over the set
IR(n) := {(x, y, z) ∈ I s.t. x+ y − z = n or (x− z)(y − z)z = 0},
where IR(n) ⊆ I(n). Observe that the condition (14) is equivalent to yf(x+1)−xf(x)+ z[f(x)−
f(x+1)] ≤ λc(y)+(µ−1)c(x). If f(x+1) ≥ f(x), the strictest condition on λ and µ correspond to
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the lowest value of z. Thus, z = max{0, x+y−n}, and either (x−z)(y−z)z = 0 or x+y−z = n. If
f(x+1) < f(x), then the largest value of z is strictest, i.e. z = min{x, y}, and (x− z)(y− z)z = 0.
Part ii): Suppose there exists (λˆ, µˆ) ∈ S(GnB) such that, λˆ1−µˆ = γ(GnB). We first show that there
must be b = (c, f) and b′ = (c′, f ′) with b, b′ ∈ B, (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′) ∈ IR(n), and η ∈ [0, 1] such
that,
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1) + c(x) = λˆ c(y) + µˆ c(x)
(z′ − x′)f ′(x′) + (y′ − z′)f ′(x′ + 1) + c′(x′) = λˆ c′(y′) + µˆ c′(x′), and,
η[zf(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1)] + (1− η)[z′f ′(x′) + (y′ − z′)f ′(x′ + 1)] = ηxf(x) + (1− η)x′f ′(x′).
(15)
Let Hb,(x,y,z) denote the set of (λ, µ) ∈ R>0 × R<1 that satisfy, for the given b, and (x, y, z),
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1) + c(x) ≤ λc(y) + µc(x).
We denote by δHb,(x,y,z) the boundary of the set, i.e. the points (λ, µ) that satisfy the above
inequality with equality. Some simplifications can be made for the cases when either x = 0 or
y = 0. When x = 0, then y > 0, z = 0, and the halfplane Hb,(0,y,0) contains all λ ≥ f(1)y/c(y).
When y = 0, then x > 0, z = 0, and the halfplane Hb,(x,0,0) contains all µ ≥ 1 − xf(x)/c(x). For
the halfplanes with x > 0 and y > 0, the boundary is,
µ = − c(y)
c(x)
λ+
1
c(x)
[
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1) + c(x)
]
.
Note that finding (λˆ, µˆ) such that λˆ/(1 − µˆ) = γ(GnB) is equivalent to finding the point along
the boundary of ∩B,IR(n)Hb,(x,y,z) that is tangent to the line with µ-intercept equal to 1 and the
most negative slope (see e.g., Fig. 1). Thus, we can find the optimal pair (λ, µ) by starting at the
point λ = maxt,y ft(1)y/ct(y) and µ = 1, then following the south-west boundary until we reach
a line with µ-intercept less than or equal to 1. There are three possibilities for where the optimal
pair (λ, µ) occur: at λ = maxy f(1)y/c(y), at the intersection of two halfplane lines δHb,(x,y,z) and
δHb′,(x′,y′,z′) with x, x′ > 0, y, y′ > 0, and z, z′ ≥ 0, or at µ = 1 −minb∈B,x>0 xf(x)/c(x). For all
three of these cases, there exists η ∈ [0, 1] such that,
η[zf(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1)] + (1− η)[z′f ′(x′) + (y′ − z′)f ′(x′ + 1)] = ηxf(x) + (1− η)x′f ′(x′),
where b = (c, f) and (x, y, z) correspond to one of the intersecting halfplanes, and b′ = (c′, f ′) and
(x′, y′, z′), to the other. If the optimal pair (λ, µ) is on a halfplane Hb,(x,y,z) with µ-intercept equal
to 1, we select b = b′ = b, and (x1, y1, z1) = (x2, y2, z2) = (x, y, z), and any η ∈ [0, 1].
Next, for the optimal parameters b, b′, (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′) and η obtained above, we construct a
game instance G such that γ(GnB) = PoA(G). We define two disjoint cycles R1 = {r1, . . . , rn} and
R2 = {rn+1, . . . , r2n}. Every r ∈ R1 has basis b = (c, f) and vr = η, while every r ∈ R2 has basis
b′ = (c′, f ′) and vr = (1− η). We define the player set N = {1, . . . , n}, where each player i ∈ N has
action set Ai = {anei , aopti }. In action anei , the player i selects x consecutive resources in R1 starting
with ri, i.e. {ri, r(i mod n)+1, . . . , r((i+x−2) mod n)+1}, and x′ consecutive resources in R2 starting
with resource rn+i. In a
opt
i , player i selects y consecutive resources in R1 ending with resource
r((i+z−2) mod n)+1, i.e. {r((i+z−y−1) mod n)+1, . . . , r((i+z−2) mod n)+1}, and y′ consecutive resources in
R2 ending with resource rn+((i+z′−2) mod n)+1. We provide an illustration of this game construction
in Fig. 2. Observe that ane = (ane1 , . . . , a
ne
n ) satisfies the conditions for a Nash equilibrium,
Ji(a
ne) = ηxf(x) + (1− η)x′f ′(x′)
= η[zf(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1)] + (1− η)[z′f ′(x′) + (y′ − z′)f ′(x′ + 1)] = Ji(aopti , ane−i),
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∩B,IR(n)Hb,(x,y,z)
µ
λ
µ = 1
λ = maxt,y>0
y
ct(y)
ft(1)
(λˆ, µˆ)
λ
1−µ =
λˆ
1−µˆ
Figure 1: Illustration of the optimal pair of (λ, µ) in S(GnB). As described in Part ii) of Theorem 3,
the optimal pair of (λ, µ) in S(GnB) is the point on the boundary of ∩B,IR(n)Hb,(x,y,z) that is tangent
to the line with µ-intercept equal to 1 and the most negative slope (the red line in the plot). A
valid method of finding this point is described by the blue arrow; begin at λ = maxt,y ft(1)y/ct(y)
and µ = 1, then follow the south-west boundary until we reach the a halfplane with µ-intercept
less than or equal to 1.
which holds by our choice of parameters b, b′ ∈ B, (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′) ∈ IR(n) and η ∈ [0, 1]. As,
C(ane) = C(ane)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) +
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)
= n η
[
λˆ c(y) + µˆ c(x)
]
+ n (1− η)
[
λˆ c′(y′) + µˆ c′(x′)
]
= λˆ C(aopt) + µˆ C(ane),
where aopt = (aopt1 , . . . , a
opt
n ), we conclude that γ(GnB) = PoA(G) ≤ PoA(GnB).
Part iii): Suppose no point (λ, µ) ∈ S(GnB) satisfies λ/(1 − µ) = γ(GnB). First, we will show that
there exist b ∈ B and (x, y, z) ∈ IR(n) such that γ(GnB) = c(x)/c(y) and (y − z)f(x+ 1) + zf(x) >
xf(x).
Borrowing the notation and reasoning of part ii), we note that the strictest constraint must come
from a line corresponding to some basis b = (c, f) ∈ B that for some values of (x, y, z) ∈ IR(n) has
µ-intercept greater than 1, and the least negative slope among all constraints. Since the µ-intercept
is greater than 1, (z−x)f(x)+(y−z)f(x+1) > 0, which implies that (y−z)f(x+1)+zf(x) > xf(x).
The least negative slope results from selecting y = argminy∈N c(y) and x = argmaxx∈N c(x). Much
like in [31, Lem. 5.5], we construct a sequence {(λk, µk)} in S(GnB) such that λk1−µk ↓ γ(GnB). Since
λ/(1 − µ) is increasing in both λ and µ, it can be assumed that every point (λk, µk) lies on the
boundary of S(GnB). The values λk are bounded from below by the constraints (14) where x = z = 0,
and for finite γ(GnB), µk ≤ b < 1, for some b ∈ R. Since λ/(1−µ) is continuous, λk/(1−µk) ↓ γ(GnB)
and γ(GnB) is not attained, the sequence {λk, µk} has no limit point. Thus, after some rearranging
of (14), for µk → −∞,
γ(GnB) = lim
k→∞
λk
1− µk = limk→∞
c(x)
c(y)
+
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1)
c(y)(1 − µk) =
c(x)
c(y)
.
Using the parameters b = (c, f) ∈ B and (x, y, z) ∈ IR(n) for which γ(GnB) = c(x)/c(y), and
(y − z)f(x + 1) + zf(x) > xf(x), as above, we setup a game G such that PoA(G) = γ(GnB).
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R1
vr = η, ∀r ∈ R1
(c, f) = b, ∀r ∈ R1
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5rn−3
rn−2
rn−1
rn
R2
vr = 1 − η, ∀r ∈ R2
(c′, f ′) = b′, ∀r ∈ R2
rn+1
rn+2
rn+3
rn+4
rn+5r2n−3
r2n−2
r2n−1
r2n
i
1
2
...
n
anei
R1 R2
...
aopti
R1 R2
...
Figure 2: The game instance construction G consisting of n players, and two disjoint cycles R1 and
R2, as described in Theorem 3, Part ii). Suppose we are given a set of basis pairs B, and positive
integer n, and that there exist values λˆ > 0 and µˆ < 1 for which λˆ/(1−µˆ) = γ(GnB). Further, suppose
that the optimal parameters from Part ii) are b, b′ ∈ B, (x, y, z) = (4, 2, 0), (x′ , y′, z′) = (3, 4, 2) ∈
IR(n) and η ∈ [0, 1]. In the above figure, we illustrate a game G ∈ GnB with PoA(G) = γ(GnB),
according to the reasoning in Part ii). Observe that each resource r ∈ R1 has vr = η, and
(cr, fr) = b, whereas each resource r ∈ R2 has vr = 1− η, and (cr, fr) = b′. Each player i ∈ N has
two actions anei and a
opt
i , as defined in the table on the right. Due to the definitions of the players’
actions, every resource in R1 is selected by 4 players in the allocation ane = (ane1 , . . . , anen ), and 3
players in aopt = (aopt1 , . . . , a
opt
n ), where no player i ∈ N has a common resource between its actions
anei and a
opt
i , i.e., xr = 4 = x, yr = 3 = y, and zr = 0 = z for all r ∈ R1. Similarly, xr = 3 = x′,
yr = 4 = y
′, and zr = 2 = z
′, for each resource r ∈ R2.
Consider the n-player game G with n resources organized in a cycle, i.e. R = {r1, . . . , rn} and
N = {1, . . . , n}, where every resource has basis b and value vr = 1. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed
with the action set Ai = {anei , aopti }; in anei , the player selects x consecutive resources starting
with ri and ending with r(i+x−2 mod n)+1, while in a
opt
i , it selects y consecutive resources ending
with r(i+z−2 mod n)+1. By our choice of parameters, the strategy a
ne = (ane1 , . . . , a
ne
n ) is a Nash
equilibrium, and PoA(G) = c(x)/c(y) = γ(GnB), as required.
4.3 Computing the price-of-anarchy
Building atop Theorem 3, we now demonstrate how to compute the exact price-of-anarchy for a
scalable class of local cost-sharing games via a tractable linear program.
Theorem 4. For any given set of basis pairs B = {b1, . . . , bm}, and for any positive integer n,
PoA(GnB) = 1/C∗, where C∗ is the value of the following linear program,
C∗ = max
ν∈R≥0,ρ∈R
ρ
s.t. c(y)− ρc(x) + ν [(x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1)] ≥ 0
∀(c, f) ∈ B, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n),
(16)
where I(n) := {(x, y, z) ∈ N3 s.t. 1 ≤ x+ y − z ≤ n and z ≤ min{x, y}}, and
IR(n) := {(x, y, z) ∈ I s.t. x+ y − z = n or (x− z)(y − z)z = 0}. (17)
For ease of notation, and without loss of generality, we set f(0) = f(n+ 1) = 0 for all (c, f) ∈ B.
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Proof. We demonstrate that solving the linear program (16) is equivalent to computing the value
γ(GnB) from Theorem 3. In Part i) of the proof of Theorem 3, we show that we need only consider
(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n) when calculating γ(GnB). By substituting ρ = (1 − µ)/λ, and ν = 1/λ into the
constraints of (16), and rearranging, we get
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1) + c(x) ≤ λc(y) + µc(x),
for all (c, f) ∈ B, and all (x, y, z) ∈ IR(n), which is identical to (14). Next, observe that maximizing
ρ is equivalent to minimizing λ/(1 − µ), which concludes the proof.
Remark 1. While one might expect the price-of-anarchy for a given basis set B and positive integer
n to be the worst over each of the elements in B, i.e. PoA(GnB) = maxb∈B
{
PoA
(
Gn{b}
)}
, this
statement turns out to be wrong. For example, consider the class of games GnB with n = 3 and
B = {b1, b2}, where b1 = (c1(x) = x2, f1(x) = x), and b2 = (c2(x) = x, f2(x) = x). Using the linear
program in Theorem 4, we get PoA(G3{b1}) = 2.5, PoA(G3{b2}) = 2.0, and PoA(G3B) = 2.6. For this
particular choice of n and basis set B, PoA(GnB) > maxb∈B PoA(Gn{b}).
4.4 Optimizing the price-of-anarchy
We now shift our focus to designing the functions {Ji} such that the price-of-anarchy is minimized.
Recall that this problem is relevant to the design of distributed algorithms using the game design
approach, when the price-of-anarchy is the performance bound of interest, see the introduction.
Observe that, for a given scalable class of local cost-sharing games, designing the player cost
functions corresponds to defining the cost-generating functions {fr}r∈R. In the following theorem,
we provide a tractable linear program for computing an optimal set of cost-generating functions
that minimizes PoA(GnB).
Theorem 5. Consider the cost functions {c1, . . . , cm}, and positive integer n. A set of cost-
generating functions fopt = {fopt1 , . . . , foptm } such that
fopt ∈ argmin
f∈Rn×m
PoA(GnB), (18)
is given by the solutions to,
(foptt , ρ
opt
t ) ∈ argmax
f∈Rn,ρ∈R
ρ
s.t. ct(y)− ρct(x) + (x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1) ≥ 0,
∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n),∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(19)
where IR(n) is defined as in (17). The price-of-anarchy corresponding to the optimal choice of
cost-generating functions fopt is PoA(GnBopt) = maxt∈{1,...,m}
{
1
ρ
opt
t
}
.
Remark 2. While the price-of-anarchy of GnB is not equal to the worst price-of-anarchy over each
individual pair b ∈ B (as we have learned in Remark 1), this property is recovered for the optimal
choice fopt. This constitutes the key observation towards proving Theorem 5.
Proof. Each of the cost-generating functions foptt minimizes its corresponding PoA(Gn{(ct,f)}) by the
following reasoning, borrowed from [37, Thm. 3]. For each function c, we wish to find a function
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fopt that maximizes ρ in (16). Such a function is guaranteed to exist by [36, Lem. 5], and is
equivalent to finding the solution to
fopt ∈ argmax
f∈Rn
max
ν∈R≥0,ρ∈R
ρ
s.t. c(y)− ρc(x) + ν[(x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1)] ≥ 0, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n).
In order to avoid having to solve a nonlinear program, we can combine ν and f in f˜(j) := νf(j).
We can now merge the two max operators to get
(f˜opt, ρopt) ∈ argmax
f∈Rn,ρ∈R
ρ
s.t. c(y)− ρc(x) + (x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1) ≥ 0, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n).
We note that f˜opt ∈ Rn must be feasible as f˜opt(j) = νfopt(j), and we know that fopt ∈ Rn exists.
We further note that PoA(f˜opt) = PoA(fopt) as equilibrium conditions are invariant to scaling.
Thus, the lowest achievable price-of-anarchy is maxb∈Bopt{PoA(Gn{b})}. We must have that
PoA(GnBopt) = max
b∈Bopt
{PoA(Gn{b})},
holds by the construction of foptt in [37, Thm. 3]; the linear program already multiplies the cost-
generating function and ν∗t , and we show in the proof of Lemma 1 that αt = ν
∗
t for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
is an optimal set of scaling parameters.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 5, but is stated here more generally.
Lemma 1. For a given scalable class of local cost-sharing games GnB with B = {b1, . . . , bm}, there
exist scaling parameters αt ∈ R≥0, for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that,
PoA(GnB′ , n) = max
b∈B
{PoA(Gn{b})},
where B′ = {(c1, α1f1), . . . , (cm, αmfm)}.
Proof. We denote by (ν∗t , ρ
∗
t ) the solution to Theorem 4 for the class of games Gn{b}, for each b ∈ B.
First, note that scaling of the cost-generating function does not affect the equilibrium conditions,
i.e. PoA(Gn{(c,αf)}) = PoA(Gn{(c,f)}) for α > 0 and all (c, f) ∈ B. Since any worst-case game in Gn{b} is
also a member of the class of games GnB, PoA(GnB′) ≥ maxb∈B{PoA(Gn{b})}. We select αt = ν∗t for all
t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and define B′ := {(ct, ν∗t ft)}mt=1, and ρˆ := mint∈{1,...,m} ρ∗t . By construction, (ρˆ, 1)
satisfies all the constraints in (16) for b ∈ B′. Thus, PoA(GnB′) ≤ 1/ρˆ = maxb∈B{PoA(Gn{b})}.
5 Welfare-Maximization Games
Although the primary focus of this paper is on cost-minimization problems, many of the results
that we have obtained can be analogously derived for welfare-maximization problems.3 A welfare-
maximization problem consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, where each agent i ∈ N is
associated with a finite action set Ai. The global objective is to maximize the system’s welfare,
which is measured by the welfare functionW : A → R>0, i.e. we wish to find the allocation aopt ∈ A,
such that aopt ∈ argmaxa∈AW (a). As in the previous section, we consider a game-theoretic model
3We do not provide proofs for any of our results for welfare-maximization games, as they closely parallel the results
in the previous two sections.
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where each agent i is associated with a local utility function Ui : A → R, which it uses to evaluate
its own actions. We represent a welfare-maximization game as a tuple G = (N,A,W, {Ui}).
Given a welfare-maximization game G, a pure Nash equilibrium is defined as an allocation
ane ∈ A such that Ui(ane) ≥ Ui(ai, ane−i) for all a ∈ Ai and i ∈ N . The price-of-anarchy in
welfare-maximization games is defined similarly to (3) and (4),4
PoA(G) :=
maxa∈AW (a)
mina∈NE(G)W (a)
≥ 1, PoA(G) := sup
G∈G
PoA(G) ≥ 1,
where a lower value of the price-of-anarchy corresponds to an improved performance. We begin
with the definition of generalized smoothness for welfare-maximization games and will then provide
the analogue of Theorem 1.
Definition 3. The welfare-maximization game G is (λ, µ)-generalized smooth if, for any two allo-
cations a, a′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ > −1 satisfying,
n∑
i=1
Ui(a
′
i, a−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ui(a) +W (a) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a). (20)
Theorem 6. The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-generalized smooth, welfare-maximization game G
is upper-bounded as,
PoA(G) ≤ 1 + µ
λ
.
We define the generalized robust price-of-anarchy of a class of welfare-maximization games G
as
GPoA(G) := inf
λ>0,µ>−1
{
1 + µ
λ
s.t. (20) holds ∀G ∈ G
}
. (21)
As an analogue to the class of local cost-sharing games, here we introduce a special class of
welfare-maximization games, called local utility-allocation games. Games in this class feature a set
of resources R, where each resource r ∈ R has a welfare function wr : N → R, and a utility-
allocation function fr : N → R. Each player has an associated action set Ai ⊆ 2R. Finally, the
system welfare and player utility functions are defined as
W (a) =
∑
r∈R
wr(|a|r), Ui(ai, a−i) =
∑
r∈ai
fr(|a|r).
As we did with local cost-sharing games, we adopt the convention that wr(0) = 0 for all r ∈ R. We
represent a local utility-allocation game as defined above with the tuple G = (N,R,A, {(wr , fr)}).
We define the scalable class of local utility-allocation games GnB as the set of all n-player local utility-
allocation games, where every resource r ∈ R has (wr, fr) = (vrw, vrf) for some pair (w, f) = b ∈
B = {b1, . . . , bm}, and some vr ≥ 0. Within this class the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is a
tight upper-bound on pure Nash equilibrium efficiency.
Theorem 7. For any set of basis pairs B = {b1, . . . , bm}, and positive integer n, it holds that
PoA(GnB) = GPoA(GnB). Further, there exists a game instance G ∈ GnB with resource set R such
that |R| ≤ 2n, satisfying PoA(G) = PoA(GnB).
4 For consistency with the previous sections, we opt to define the price-of-anarchy in welfare-maximization games
as the ratio between the optimal allocation and the worst-performing Nash equilibrium, in contrast with previous
works, see e.g. [17, 31]. This is achieved by inverting the ratio, such that the price-of-anarchy is defined as the ratio
between the welfare at optimum, and the welfare at the worst equilibrium in NE(G). By adopting this formalism,
we retain the overall objective of minimizing the system’s price-of-anarchy.
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Similarly to the result in Theorem 4, we provide the linear program for characterizing the
price-of-anarchy of a scalable class of local utility-allocation games.
Theorem 8. For any given set of basis pairs B = {b1, . . . , bm}, and for any positive integer n,
PoA(GnB) = W ∗, where W ∗ is the value of the following linear program,
W ∗ = min
ν∈R≥0,ρ∈R
ρ
s.t. w(y)− ρw(x) + ν [(x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1)] ≤ 0
∀(w, f) = b ∈ B, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n),
(22)
where we set f(0) = f(n+ 1) = 0 for all (w, f) ∈ B, and IR is defined as in (17).
The linear program in the following theorem returns the optimal price-of-anarchy and the
optimal utility-allocation functions of a given scalable class of local utility-allocation games.
Theorem 9. Consider the welfare functions {w1, . . . , wm}, and positive integer n. A set of utility-
allocation functions fopt = {fopt1 , . . . , foptm } such that fopt ∈ argminf∈Rn×m≥0 PoA(G
n
B(f)), is given by
the solutions to
(foptt , ρ
opt
t ) ∈ argmin
f∈Rn≥0,ρ∈R
ρ
s.t. wt(y)− ρwt(x) + (x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1) ≤ 0,
∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n),∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
where IR(n) is defined as in (17). The price-of-anarchy corresponding to the optimal choice of
utility-allocation functions fopt is PoA(Gn
Bopt
) = maxt∈{1,...,m} ρ
opt
t .
6 Illustrative Classes of Games
In this section, we illustrate the findings of this manuscript by applying them to three distinct
classes of resource-allocation problems studied in the literature.
6.1 Price-of-anarchy in atomic congestion games
We consider the framework of atomic congestion games as defined in Example 1. For the purposes
of this illustration, we first consider the well-studied class of polynomial congestion games with
order d ≥ 1 [48, 32], and recall that this class is equivalent to the scalable class of local cost-sharing
games GnB , with positive integer n, and basis set B = {(x, 1), . . . , (xd+1, xd)}. Characterizations
of the price-of-anarchy for various classes of polynomial congestion games have been derived, in
e.g., [31, 47, 48, 32]. Although the bounds provided by the robust price-of-anarchy in congestion
games are indeed exact, [47, 48, 32] are forced to use a combination of traditional smoothness
arguments, and a nontrivial game construction in order to obtain tight, asymptotic bounds on the
price-of-anarchy. In contrast, using the linear program in Theorem 4, the problem of finding tight
price-of-anarchy bounds for n-player, polynomial congestion games can be recast into a tractable
linear program with two decision variables, ρ = (1 − µ)/λ and ν = 1/λ, and O(n2) constraints,
thus requiring no additional analysis. Furthermore, we are able to automatically construct worst-
case game instances with n players, and 2n resources. Note that generalized smoothness can be
used to produce novel and exact price-of-anarchy results for any basis set B. For example, if the
latency functions are taken as ℓe(x) = ae
√
x, ae ≥ 0 we have B = {(x ·
√
x,
√
x)}, thus obtaining
a price-of-anarchy of 1.50 through the solution of the linear program in Theorem 4. Similarly, if
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(Theorem 4) [32]
1 2.5 2.5
2 9.583 9.583
3 41.54 41.54
4 267.6 267.6
5 1,514 1,514
6 12,345 12,345
7 98,734 98,734
8 802,603 802,603
Figure 3: Comparison of the prices-of-anarchy for finite-player, and infinite-player congestion
games. The plot (left) shows the growth of the price-of-anarchy in the classes of polynomial
congestion games with order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players n is increased from 1 to 10.
These exact bounds were obtained using the tractable linear program in Theorem 4 for the class
GnB , and basis set B = {(x, 1x≥1(x)), . . . , (xd+1, xd)}. Observe that the price-of-anarchy of each
class has already converged to its asymptotic value with n = 6. This is confirmed by the table
(right), where we compile the prices-of-anarchy for the classes of 6-player games, and the bounds
previously obtained in the literature for classes with infinite players, see [47, 48, 32]. According to
Theorem 3, this means that there is a 6-player worst-case game instance with at most 12 resources
for every class of polynomial congestion games with order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}.
the latency functions are assumed to be of the form ℓe(x) = ae(log(x) + 1), ae ≥ 0 , we have
B = {x · (log(x) + 1), log(x) + 1)} and a resulting price-of-anarchy of 1.835.
In Fig. 3, we plot the evolution of the price-of-anarchy for polynomial congestion games with
order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players n is increased from 1 to 10. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first characterization of the dependence of the price-of-anarchy of polynomial
congestion games on the number of players n. We compile the price-of-anarchy bounds for the
classes of 6-player, polynomial congestion games in the table of Fig. 3. We observe that these
bounds match the tight, asymptotic bounds on the price-of-anarchy of polynomial congestion games
obtained in [47, 48, 32], reproduced in the table.5 We provide an example worst-case game instance
for the class of 6-player polynomial congestion games with order d = 8 in Fig. 4.
6.2 Covering games
For the next illustration, we consider a generalization of the class of covering games studied in
e.g. [17, 18], which we refer to as κ-coverage games [21]. A κ-coverage game is a local utility-
allocation game G with player set N = {1, . . . , n}, resource set R, and postive integer κ. Each
resource r ∈ R has an associated value vr ≥ 0, and welfare function wr(x) = vrwκ(x), where
wκ(x) =
{
x if 0 ≤ x ≤ κ
κ if x > κ.
Informally, a resource’s contribution to the system welfare grows linearly in the number of players
selecting the resource, until it exceeds a threshold level κ, at which point the resource’s contribution
plateaus. The utility-allocation functions are fr(x) = vrf(x) for all r ∈ R, where the function
f : N → R is thought of as a free design parameter. The goal is to design f such that the
5Note that this implies that, by our result in Theorem 3, there are 6-player game instances G with |R| ≤ 12 such
that PoA(G) = PoA(GnB) for every class of polynomial congestion games with order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}.
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Figure 4: A worst-case game instance for the class of 6-player polynomial congestion games with
order d = 8. As the price-of-anarchy is achieved for finite λ, µ, we follow Theorem 3 Part ii) for the
construction. The optimal parameters are b = b′ = (x9, x8), (x, y, z) = (4, 1, 0), (x′, y′, z′) = (5, 1, 0),
and η = 128481401990 . According to the construction, each player i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} has action set Ai =
{anei , aopti } as illustrated in the table (right). In the allocation ane = (ane1 , . . . , ane6 ), each resource
r ∈ R1 is selected by 4 players, and each resource r ∈ R2 is selected by 5 players. In the allocation
aopt = (aopt1 , . . . , a
opt
6 ), every resource is selected by 1 player. There is no resource in common
between actions anei and a
opt
i for any player i ∈ [6]. It is straightforward to verify that ane is a Nash
equilibrium. The system cost imposed by ane and aopt are C(ane) = 273509401990 ·6 ·(4)9+ 128481401990 ·6 ·(5)9 =
4, 815, 615, and C(aopt) = 273509401990 · 6 · (1)9 + 128481401990 · 6 · (1)9 = 6, respectively. Their ratio gives
C(ane)/C(aopt) = 802, 603 ≤ PoA(GnB).
resulting equilibria have the highest possible efficiency. We observe that the class of n-player,
κ-coverage games can be captured as the scalable class of local utility-allocation games GnB with
basis set B := {(wκ, f)}. We note that κ-coverage games [21] reduce to covering games [17], when
κ = 1. The class of κ-coverage problems can be used to model list-decoding in noisy channels, and
combinatorial auctions [21], while coverage games (κ = 1) find various applications in e.g., sensor
allocation problems [12], job scheduling, facility locations [49].
[21] study a special class of the κ-coverage problem where all resources r ∈ R are valued equally.
In Thm. 1.1 of that work, they show that there exists a centralized, polynomial-time algorithm that
returns a distribution σ ∈ ∆(A) whose approximation ratio is bounded by
maxa∈AW (a)
Ea∼σ [W (a)]
≤
(
1− κ
κe−κ
κ!
)−1
. (23)
Informally, (23) guarantees that the distribution σ returned by the algorithm in [21] has expected
welfare higher than 1 − κκe−κ/κ! times the optimal. We now investigate whether a distributed
algorithm could be designed with equilibrium efficiency guarantees close to the ratio in (23). The
following corollary demonstrates that such distributed algorithms exist for any κ-coverage problem,
irrespective of whether the resources r ∈ R are valued equally or not. This result emerges as a
direct application of the game design approach discussed in the introduction, together with the
linear programming framework developed in this manuscript.
Corollary 1. Consider the class of κ-coverage games with n, κ ≥ 1. There exists a utility-allocation
function f∗ : N → R such that, for B∗ = {(wκ, f∗)},
PoA(GnB∗) ≤
(
1− κ
κe−κ
κ!
)−1
=: ρ∗(κ).
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(Theorem 9) [21]
1 1.5819767 1.5819767
2 1.3711225 1.3711225
3 1.2887292 1.2887292
4 1.2428023 1.2428023
5 1.2128083 1.2128083
6 1.1913600 1.1913600
7 1.1750918 1.1750920
8 1.1622288 1.1622319
Figure 5: The optimal price-of-anarchy in the class of κ-coverage games. In the plot (left), we
illustrate the optimal price-of-anarchy for the class of κ-coverage games for values of κ ∈ {1, . . . , 8},
as the number of players is increased from 1 to 25. These optimal prices-of-anarchy, as well as
their corresponding optimal utility-allocation functions fopt, were obtained for the welfare function
wκ using the tractable linear program in Theorem 9 for each combination of n ∈ {1, . . . , 25}, and
κ ∈ {1, . . . , 8}. In Corollary 1, we prove that these optimal price-of-anarchy converge asymptotically
to the value ρ∗(κ). In the table (right), we observe that the optimal price-of-anarchy matches ρ∗(κ)
to six or more significant figures, for the classes of 25-player, κ-coverage games considered. Our
analysis shows that one can design a distributed algorithm with performance guarantees equal to
those of the centralized solution in [21] by coupling our optimal utility-allocation functions fopt
with an appropriate distributed learning algorithm.
The inequality holds with equality in the limit as n → ∞. Furthermore, such a utility-allocation
function f∗ is recursively defined as f∗(1) = 1, and
f∗(x+ 1) =
min{x, n− κ}
min{κ, n − x}f
∗(x)− min{x, κ}
min{κ, n − x}ρ
∗(κ) +
κ
min{κ, n − x} , ∀x ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof. The proof is reported in Appendix A.
In Fig. 5, we provide a characterization of the optimal price-of-anarchy in κ-coverage games for
κ ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players n is increased from 1 to 25 by solving the linear program
in Theorem 9. Observe that the optimal price-of-anarchy for the classes of 25-player, κ-coverage
games matches ρ∗(κ) to six significant figures.
By Theorem 2, the upper-bound ρ∗(κ) extends to the efficiency of all average coarse-correlated
equilibria. Thus, by pairing the player utilities derived from the function f∗ with any distributed
learning algorithm capable of computing an average coarse-correlated equilibrium (or coarse-correlated
equilibrium), one obtains a fully-distributed algorithm with identical approximation guarantees to
the centralized solution proposed in [21].
6.3 Probabilistic-objective games
Our final illustrative example focuses on a well-studied class of welfare-maximization games, that
we term probabilistic-objective games [50, 20, 51]. A probabilistic-objective game is a local utility-
allocation game G with player set N = {1, . . . , n}, and set of resources R. Each resource r ∈ R
represents an objective that has an associated value vr ≥ 0, probability of failure qr ∈ [0, 1], and
welfare wr(x) = vrw
qr(x), where
wq(x) = 1− qx, ∀x ≥ 0.
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Intuitively, if more players select the same resource r ∈ R, its contribution to the system wel-
fare increases, albeit with diminishing returns. Similar to κ-coverage games, the utility-allocation
functions correspond to fr(x) = vrf
qr(x) for all r ∈ R, where each function f qr : N → R is a
free design parameter. Similar to the previous example, the goal is to design each function f qr
in order to maximize the efficiency of the resulting equilibria. Observe that the class of n-player
probabilistic-objective games is captured by the scalable class of local utility-allocation games GnB ,
with basis set B = {(wq1 , f q1), . . . , (wqm , f qm)}, where Q = {q1, . . . , qm} are the probabilities of
failure for the different types of resources. In the literature, problems such as animal dispersal in
a common environment [50], credit assignment in group research projects [20], and vehicle-target
assignment [51] have all been modelled under this common game structure.
[20] design utility-allocation functions for a class of probabilistic-objective games that optimize
the robust price-of-anarchy as a surrogate to optimizing the true price-of-anarchy. The class of
games they consider restricts resources to a single probability of failure q ∈ [0, 1], i.e., qr = q
for all r ∈ R. The equilibrium efficiency guarantee achieved by [20] is 2, which is the optimal
robust price-of-anarchy for q = 0. Instead, using our approach, we are able to design utility-
allocation functions that directly optimize the price-of-anarchy using Theorem 9, achieving an
improved efficiency guarantee of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.582 < 2, which is the optimal price-of-anarchy for
q = 0. Optimizing the robust price-of-anarchy for any value of q ∈ [0, 1] results in worse efficiency
guarantees than those obtained by directly optimizing the price-of-anarchy, see Fig. 6.
We observe that, by Part iv. of Proposition 1, the robust price-of-anarchy is optimized by
the equal-shares utility-allocation function, f esr (x) = wr(x)/x for all r ∈ R. This is because the
equal-shares function is the unique utility-allocation function for which
n∑
i=1
Ji(a) =
∑
r∈R
xrfr(xr) =
∑
r∈R
wr(xr) = C(a),
for all a ∈ A. Thus, the price-of-anarchy achieved by optimizing the robust price-of-anarchy can be
computed using the linear program in Theorem 8, for the basis set B = {(wq, wq(x)/x)}. In the left
plot of Fig. 6, we observe that the optimal robust price-of-anarchy is strictly greater than the optimal
price-of-anarchy in probabilistic-objective games for all values of q ∈ [0, 1). On the right, we plot the
functions fopt and f es for two values of q ∈ [0, 1]. Although they are both nonincreasing and convex,
the differences between the optimal, and equal-shares utility-allocation functions cause the gap in
prices-of-anarchy observed in the left plot. As previously noted, a set of optimal utility-allocation
functions for a class of probabilistic-objective games with different probabilities of failure q ∈ Q can
be obtained by deriving an optimal utility-allocation function for each function wq. Further, the
optimal price-of-anarchy for the entire class of games is dictated by the worst-performing resource
type. In a class of probabilistic-objective games, the worst-performing resource type has the lowest
probability of failure.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we sought to improve our capabilities in computing and optimizing the price-of-anarchy
in games. The end goal was to use our new insights to inform the design of agent utility functions as
part of the game design approach. Toward this end, we first introduced the generalized smoothness
framework, which we showed is more widely applicable, and provides more precise price-of-anarchy
bounds when compared to the standard smoothness approach of [31]. Next, we prove that by using
a generalized smoothness argument one obtains the exact price-of-anarchy for the class of scalable
local cost-sharing/utility-allocation games. Finally, we show that the problems of computing the
price-of-anarchy, and optimizing the price-of-anarchy over the players’ cost/utility functions can
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Figure 6: Optimal prices-of-anarchy and their corresponding utility-allocation functions according
to the traditional, and generalized smoothness frameworks in classes of probabilistic-objective games.
Plot left. The prices-of-anarchy corresponding to the optimal utility-allocation functions designed
using the traditional, and generalized smoothness frameworks for classes of 25-player probabilistic-
objective games with qr = q, for all r ∈ R. We have plotted these bounds against the one
obtained using a traditional smoothness argument in [20, Thm. 2.7] (i.e., PoA ≤ (2n − 1)/n).
The optimal robust prices-of-anarchy are computed using the linear program in Theorem 8, for the
choice of utility-allocation function f es(j) = wq(j)/j. These are plotted as PoAes. The optimal
prices-of-anarchy, and corresponding optimal utility-allocation functions {fopt}, are computed using
Theorem 9, and are denoted as PoAopt. Plots middle and right. The utility-allocation functions
fopt and f es for classes of 25-player probabilistic-objective games with q ∈ {0.5, 0.75}.
be posed as tractable linear programs. We showcased the strength and breadth of our approach
by recovering many existing results devoted to the quantification of the price-of-anarchy. We have
also shown how the game design approach can be coupled with the linear programming framework
developed here so as to design novel distributed algorithms equipped with performance guarantees.
This approach finds application to relevant and well-studied classes problems. We note that the
price-of-anarchy represents but one of many metrics for measuring algorithm performance. Future
work should be devoted to analyzing the potential losses in performance with respect to other
metrics when designing algorithms with the best achievable price-of-anarchy.
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A Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We use the constraints from the linear program in Theorem 9 to derive the lowest achiev-
able ρ, and, thus, the lowest achievable price-of-anarchy, for any nonincreasing utility-allocation
functions, i.e. f(x+ 1) ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ N . The assumption that the utility-allocation function
f is nonincreasing greatly simplifies the analysis. For w(x) = min{ℓ, x}, the constraints are
w(y)− ρw(x) + (x− z)f(x)− (y − z)f(x+ 1) ≤ 0, ∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR(n).
The rest of the proof is organized into the following sections: in part i) we use the above
constraint in order to derive some properties of the optimal nonincreasing utility-allocation function
f∗(x), in part ii) we show that the choice y = min{ℓ, n − ℓ} for all x ∈ N is strictest, and in part
iii) we use the results of the previous two steps to determine an expression for the best achievable
price-of-anarchy as n → ∞. Since the price-of-anarchy can only get worse as n → ∞, this limit
represents an upper-bound on the best achievable price-of-anarchy for any given n. We will use the
fact that the strictest inequality holds with equality for the optimal values of the decision variables
f∗ and ρ several times in our reasoning.
Part i): When x = 0, then z0 = 0 and y0 ≥ 1, and
min{y, ℓ} − yf(1) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ f(1) ≥ min{y, ℓ}
y
⇐⇒ f(1) ≥ 1.
The optimal value then is f(1) = 1. For x = n, zn = yn, and
min{y, ℓ} − ρmin{n, ℓ}+ (n− y)f(n) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ f(n) ≤ ρℓ−min{y, ℓ}
n− y . (24)
Finally, by the assumption that the strictest inequality holds with equality for the optimal f , for
every x ∈ N there is some yx ∈ N such that
f(x+ 1) =
x− zx
yx − zx f(x)−
min{x, ℓ}
yx − zx ρ+
min{yx, ℓ}
yx − zx , (25)
which is just a rearrangement of the constraints from Theorem 9.
Part ii): We begin by showing that y = ℓ is stricter than y < ℓ, which is equivalent to
min{ℓ, ℓ}+ (x− zx)f(x)− (ℓ− zx)f(x+ 1) ≥ min{y, ℓ} + (x− zx)f(x)− (y − zx)f(x+ 1)
⇐⇒ f(x+ 1) ≤ 1
which must be true for nonincreasing f , since f(1) = 1 by Part ii). Similarly, proving y = ℓ is
stricter than y > ℓ is equivalent to y ≥ ℓ, which is true. We have already shown that the choice of
y = ℓ when x = 0 is the strictest constraint in Part ii).
Part iii): Since y = ℓ for all x ∈ [0, n], we can rewrite (25) as
f(x+ 1) = αxf(x)− γxρ+ βx
for αx = min{x, n − ℓ}/min{ℓ, n − x}, βx = ℓ/(ℓ − zx) and γx = min{x, ℓ}/(ℓ − zx). Since f is
nonincreasing, zx = max{0, x + yx − n}, and ℓ− zx = min{ℓ, n − x}. Solving for f(n) gives
f(n) = Πn−1j=1αjf(1) +
n−1∑
j=1
(
Πn−1i=j+1αi
)
(βj − γjρ) + (βn−1 − γn−1ρ).
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Combining the above with the constraint in (24), and rearranging for ρ, we get
ρ ≥
Πn−1j=1αjf(1) +
∑n−1
j=1
(
Πn−1i=j+1αi
)
βj + βn−1 +
ℓ
n−ℓ∑n−1
j=1
(
Πn−1i=j+1αi
)
γj + γn−1 +
ℓ
n−ℓ
.
By assuming n > 2ℓ, and expanding αx, βx and γx, the above expression becomes
ρ ≥
(n−ℓ)!(n−ℓ)ℓ−1
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
+
∑n−ℓ−1
j=1
(n−ℓ)!(n−ℓ)ℓ−1
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
ℓj
j! +
∑n−1
j=n−ℓ
ℓ
n−j
(n−ℓ)n−j−2
(n−j−1)! + βn−1 +
ℓ
n−ℓ∑ℓ
j=1
j
ℓ
(n−ℓ)!(n−ℓ)ℓ−1
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
ℓj
j! +
∑n−ℓ−1
j=ℓ+1
(n−ℓ)!(n−ℓ)ℓ−1
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
ℓj
j! +
∑n−1
j=n−ℓ
ℓ
n−j
(n−ℓ)n−j−2
(n−j−1)! + γn−1 +
ℓ
n−ℓ
=
1 +
∑n−ℓ−1
j=1
ℓj
j! +
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
(n−ℓ)!(n−ℓ)ℓ−1
(∑n−1
j=n−ℓ
ℓ
n−j
(n−ℓ)n−j−2
(n−j−1)! + βn−1 +
ℓ
n−ℓ
)
∑ℓ
j=1
j
ℓ
ℓj
j! +
∑n−ℓ−1
j=ℓ+1
ℓj
j! +
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
(n−ℓ)!(n−ℓ)ℓ−1
(∑n−1
j=n−ℓ
ℓ
n−j
(n−ℓ)n−j−2
(n−j−1)! + γn−1 +
ℓ
n−ℓ
)
Observe that in the limit as n→∞, the following expressions quickly converge to 0,
lim
n→∞
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
(n− ℓ)!(n − ℓ)ℓ−1

 n−1∑
j=n−ℓ
ℓ
n− j
(n− ℓ)n−j−2
(n− j − 1)! + βn−1 +
ℓ
n− ℓ

 = 0
lim
n→∞
ℓ!ℓn−ℓ−1
(n− ℓ)!(n − ℓ)ℓ−1

 n−1∑
j=n−ℓ
ℓ
n− j
(n− ℓ)n−j−2
(n− j − 1)! + γn−1 +
ℓ
n− ℓ

 = 0.
Thus, the above inequality further simplifies to
ρ ≥ lim
n→∞
1 +
∑n−ℓ−1
j=1
ℓj
j!∑ℓ
j=1
j
ℓ
ℓj
j! +
∑n−ℓ−1
j=ℓ+1
ℓj
j!
=
(
1− ℓ
ℓe−ℓ
ℓ!
)−1
.
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